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DEFENSE COUNSEL MISCONDUCT RESULTING
IN MISTRIAL AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A recent decision of the United States District Court, District of Columbia,
represents an ominous extension of the double jeopardy plea to prevent retrial
after a mistrial. In United States v. Whitlow,1 the trial court on its own
motion ordered a mistrial because of defense counsel's misconduct in crossexamining a witness beyond the limit of inquiry set by the court. Defendant's
subsequent plea of former jeopardy was upheld at the hearing for a new
trial. 2
Whitlow was indicted on two counts. He and two other defendants were
jointly charged with blackmail in the first count, while in the second count
he was singly charged with obtaining money by false pretenses. Specifically,
in the latter count, he was indicted for wilfully and knowingly passing a
worthless check which he and his two accomplices had allegedly extorted
from the complainant. Defense counsel moved for and was granted a severance of the two counts on the ground that the evidence for each count was
"totally different.' '3 Thereupon, Whitlow was tried only upon the false
pretenses count. The blackmail charge was subsequently dismissed.
During the trial, the court instructed defense counsel as to the scope of
permissible cross-examination in an effort to confine testimony to the false
pretenses count and to prevent introduction of blackmail evidence. 4 Nevertheless, while cross-examining a witness in an attempt to show prior conflicting statements made by the complainant, defense counsel introduced
testimony relating to the blackmail count which the court had previously
held to be inadmissible. 5 The court labeled counsel's conduct as "improper,"
questioned his motive in seeking a severance of the counts,6 and indicated it
would entertain a motion for mistrial. Although the prosecution refused
so to move, a mistrial was ordered by the court on the ground that the
had resulted in the introduction of
violation of the court's instructions
7
"highly prejudicial" testimony.
1. 110 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1953).
2. Within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, the established rule in federal courts is that an accused person is in jeopardy of
life or limb when he is put on trial in a court of competent jurisdiction upon a sufficient
indictment, and a jury has been impaneled and sworn. A defendant's right to a verdict
from the jury originally impaneled and sworn to try him is well-settled. Hunter v. Wade,
169 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948), aff'd 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
3. Severance motion filed November 12, 1952. Authorities listed: Rules 8, 13, and 14
of the United States District Court, District of Columbia; United States v. Cohen, 124

F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1941).
The Grand Jury indictment charged that the defendants induced complainant to give
them a $2,500 check by threatening to accuse him of committing unnatural sex acts on them.
Whitlow, to whom the check was made payable, cashed it at a bank.
4. Transcript of Record, pp. 105-107, United States v. Whitlow, 110 F. Supp. 871
(D.D.C. 1953).
5. Id. at 50-51; 106-107.

6.

Id. at 107.

7.- Id.

at 109.
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Defense counsel's conduct was improper because he resorted to evidence
which he himself had sought to exclude at the outset by obtaining a severance.8 This testimony impugned the veracity of the complainant for all
purposes. It was designed to cast doubt on the existence of any circumstances
of extortion, and by implication, to question whether complainant informed
Whitlow that the check was worthless. 9 Although these matters are seemingly
relevant to the charge of false pretenses, the forbidden testimony was prejudicial because the prosecution, which was restricted by the same evidentiary
barriers imposed by the severance, was precluded from relying on such
testimony to support its case.
A court's power to discharge a jury after it has been impaneled and sworn,
and without defendant's consent, by declaring a mistrial was established by
Mr. Justice Story in United States v. Perez.'0 In holding that a discharge of
the jury where it was unable to agree did not bar a new trial, the court
there proclaimed a formula which has been cited in virtually every subsequent
decision involving the mistrial issue:
".... the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge
a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the
act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.""
The opinion did not articulate the meaning of "manifest necessity" but
added that the authority was to be exercised with "sound discretion".' 2
Later courts have viewed such necessity as an emergency situation where the
continuance of a trial is impossible or impractical due to a breakdown of
judicial machinery, or simply unjust. Like the Perez case, these precedents
are descripitve, not analytical. They tend to enumerate instances of "manifest necessity" without evolving principles for applying the term. Most
frequently, "manifest necessity" for mistrial has been found in cases where
members of the jury become incapacitated or disqualified. 13 In other cases,
either the court' 4 or prosecution' 5 was directly responsible for the events
8. Id. at 107. In retrospect, it seems that the two counts were too closely connected for
convenient separation and that the evidence for each was not "totally different." Moreover, the record suggests that even the Government was at a loss to prove its case
without reference to the circumstances under which the worthless check was obtained.
In this situation, a relaxation of the court's ruling on admission of evidence was advisable,
if not imperative, for the benefit of both parties. Timely adjustment of this ruling
might well have avoided the need for mistrial and its consequent pitfalls.
9. The Government's case may have been a weak one from the evidentiary standpoint. One can only speculate how much this factor influenced the District Court's decision
to sustain the double jeopardy plea.
10. 9 Wheat. 579 (U.S. 1824).
11. Id. at 580.
12. Ibid.
13. Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909) ; Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902);
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1891) (inability of jury to agree on verdict). United
States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 584 (1941) (illness of juror,
court, or accused) ; Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (juror falsely swearing
on his ,oir dire that he was unacquainted with accused); Thompson v. United States,
155 U.S. 271 (1894) (juror served on Grand Jury which indicted accused); United States
v. McCunn, 36 F.2d 52 '(S.D. N.Y. 1929) (prejudiced juror). Less typical is the case of an
essential witness who, for reasons of conscience, refuses to take the required oath. See
United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas. 622, No. 14,858 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
14. United States v. Giles, 19 F.Supp. 1009 (W.D. Okla. 1937) (court questioned good
faith of prosecution and made other statements prejudicial to the Government, then retracted its remarks and declared mistrial suna spionte) ; Ercoli v. United States, 131 F.2d
354 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (court varied order of proof and received evidence out of its logical
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that gave rise to a mistrial and yet the double jeopardy plea was denied on
the ground that adequate necessity existed. However, entry of a nolle prosequi
by the prosecution due to insufficient evidence for conviction, 16 or to unaccountable absence of prosecution witnesses17 is not "manifest necessity"
but a concession of acquittal. Retrial for the same offense after failure of
proof for conviction would indisputably create double jeopardy.
The unsubstantial basis which precedent affords the double jeopardy plea
in the Whitlow case is evident from the authorities relied upon by the defense.
Of seven decisions cited, five rejected the double jeopardy plea 8 and two
sustained it.19 One of these sustaining decisions involved entry of a nolle
prosequi because of insufficient evidence for conviction.20 The second, more
nearly in point, is distinguishable on facts.2 A similar dearth of supporting
authority is reflected in the United States District Court's opinion in favor
of defendant Whitlow. Of the four cases cited by the court in which the
double jeopardy plea was upheld, two were nolle prosequi cases 22 and hence
unrelated to the issues of the Whitlow case; mistrial in a third was produced
by unexplained
absences of Government witnesses and the prosecuting
3
attorney.2
Both defense counsel and district court relied principally upon a nonfederal decision, State v. Whitman,2 4 to show that Whitlow had been in
jeopardy.2 5 There, the trial court declared a mistrial and discharged the
jury because it considered defense counsel's conduct "reprehensible, if not
contemptuous," and because it felt it had erred in a prior ruling.2 6 The
order so that mistrial was "necessary") ; Scott v. United States, 202 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir.
1952) (sustaining trial court's order of mistrial where judge decided he had erred by
granting admission of an associate counsel pro hac vice).
15. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949) (improper reference by
prosecutor to another criminal case pending against defendant) ; Blair v. White, 24 F.2d
323 (8th Cir. 1928) (improper reference by prosecutor to a previous conviction) ; Lovato
v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916) (accused improperly arraigned and pleaded). See also
note 14 supra. These authorities indicate that "manifest necessity" is not an emergency
in the sense that neither responsibility for nor control over the situation need be present.
It is an emergency, irrespective of cause, if a fair trial cannot be had by continuing the
proceedings. Fault, therefore, cannot be the criterion.
16. United States v. Shoemaker, 2 McLean 114 (7th Cir. 1840).
17. United States v. Watson, 28 Fed. Cas. 499, No. 16,651 (S.D.N.Y. 1868); Cornero v.
United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931) ; Hunter v. Wade, 169 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948),
aff'd, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
18. United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (U.S. 1824); Thompson v. United States, 155
U.S. 271 (1894); United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas. 622, No. 14,858 (C.C.D. Mass.
1815) ; Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) ; Himmelfarb v. United States, 175
F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949). These cases were cited by defense counsel simply for dicta which
restated the words of the Perez case that "manifest necessity" is required for mistrial.
19. United States v. Shoemaker, 2 McLean 114 (7th Cir. 1840); state v. Whitman, 93
Utah 557, 74 P.2d 696 (1937).
20. United States v. Shoemaker, supra note 19.
21. State v. Whitman, supra note 19.
22. United States v. Farring, 25 Fed. Cas. 1052, No. 15,075 (C.C.D.C. 1834); Clawans
v. Rives, 104 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
23. United States v. Watson, 28 Fed. Cas. 499, No. 16,651 (S.D.N.Y. 1868). The fourth
case is State v. Whitman, 93 Utah 557, 74 P.2d 696 (1937), discussed in the text following.
24. 93 Utah 557, 74 P.2d 696 (1937).
25. At the hearing for the double jeopardy plea, the Government confined its argument
to the trial transcript which it alleged was inaccurate and incomplete in certain respects.
It contended that the transcript should be corrected before the jeopardy plea could be
decided.
26. State v. Whitman, 93 Utah 557, 559, 74 P.2d 696, 697 (1937). Trial court was also
in doubt about the propriety of some of its remarks.
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Utah Supreme Court held that these facts did not constitute "absolute"
27
or "legal" necessity and sustained defendant's plea of double jeopardy.
Two factual distinctions make State v. Whitman an unreliable precedent
for defendant's cause. In the first place, misconduct of Whitman's counsel
was not the sole element involved. The decision put equal emphasis on the
fact that the trial judge sought to correct his own errors through the device
of mistrial. 2 8 Secondly, the nature of misconduct was basically different
from the Whitlow case. In State v. Whitman, the judge became incensed when
defense counsel took exception to the remarks and action of the court and
asked that the record show the exception. 2 9 Ordering a mistrial for such
trivial cause was perhaps rightly regarded by the Utah Supreme Court as
arbitrary and capricious. 30 In contrast, the objectionable testimony in the
Whitlow case provided more than a source of irritation for the court; it
prejudiced the prosecution. Fairness of trial was clearly at issue in the
Whitlow case, not merely the disciplining of surly or disobedient counsel.
If the introduction of prejudicial testimony by Whitlow's counsel precluded
a fair trial, as asserted by the trial court,8 ' it would seem that a mistrial
declared under the "manifest necessity" doctrine of the
was properly
32
Perez case.
Fairness is a component of necessity and justice. If the judge thus
believed that the misconduct materially damaged the Government's position,
it would be necessary and just for him to order mistrial, not to punish counsel,
but to insure a fair trial. On this basis, the trial judge's action in the
Whitlow case was a defensible exercise of "sound discretion.' '3 For the
plea of
same reason, the district court's opinion sustaining 3*Whitlow's
4
double jeopardy was a hazardous display of indiscretion.
No case favors the view that an accused may gain his freedom through
his own counsel's misconduct. Yet, in effect, the Whitlow case rejects the
rule stated by the same court in 1939 that " ... a defendant may not take
advantage of his own actions in removing himself from jeopardy....,,35
27. Id. at 560, 74 P.2d at 698.
28. Ibid. But see note 14 supra. In federal courts, the trial judge has been allowed to
correct his own errors by means of mistrial. United States v. Giles, 19 F. Supp. 1009
(W.D. Okla. 1937) ; Ercoli v. United States, 131 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Scott v. United
States, 202 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
29. State v. Whitman, 93 Utah 557, 559, 74 P.2d 696, 697 (1937).
30. Id. at 560, 74 P.2d at 698.
31. Transcript of Record, pp. 109-110, United States v. Whitlow, 110 F. Supp. 871
(D.C. 1953).
32. United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580 (U.S. 1824).
33. Since the Perez case, it has been well established that mistrial is a matter within
the "sound discretion" of the trial judge. United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas. 622, No.
14,858 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) held so earlier. See also Logan v. United States, 144 U.S.
263 (1891) ; Hunter v. Wade, 169 F.2.d 973 (10th Cir. 1948). This discretion, however,
has never been held to be unlimited or uncontrollable. The prevailing view is that the
trial judge is in a better position to appraise incidents which occur during a trial with
respect to their effect on the jury. Unless the judge has openly abused his discretion in
declaring a mistrial, it is generally assumed by appellate courts that justice will be done
if his action is not disturbed. United States v. Giles, 19 F. Supp. at 1012 (W.D. Okla.
1937) ; Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d at 932 (9th Cir. 1949).
34-. If the purpose of the trial judge was merely to reprimand disobedient counsel,
there were other measures to take more appropriate than mistrial, such as citing counsel
for contempt or even removing him from the trial. But if, as it is arguable in the Whitlow
case, the judge was more concerned with eliminating prejudicial effects of forbidden testimony, the only alternative to mistrial would be to strike that evidence from the record.
Whether the jury could be expected to ignore the testimony and hence, whether the more
drastic measure of mistrial was required, were matters for the judge to decide.
35. Pratt v. United States, 102 F.2d at 280 (D.C. Cir. 1939).

